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I. INTRODUCTION
Article II of the ConstitutionI broadly states
that the President has the fundamental duty to
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States. In United States v. United States
District Court,2 Justice Powell elaborated on Article
II by stating, "Implicit in that duty is the power to
protect our Government against those who would
subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means."3 The
United States is the most powerful country in the
world, and it arguably has the most enemies. The
National Security Agency ("NSA"), in upholding
the provisions of Article II, operates intelligence
gathering systems that protect our nation from its
enemies. 4 In carrying out this duty, the NSA must
constantly monitor communications to and from
the United States, while remaining cognizant of
the constitutional protections granted to its citi-
zens.
One of the most controversial tools at the
NSA's disposal is ECHELON. ECHELON is a tele-
communications spy network operated by the
NSA in conjunction with four other countries.
5 It
intercepts telephone, fax and e-mail transmissions
traveling to and from, and sometimes within, the
United States.6 The key issue concerning ECHE-
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
2 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
3 Id. at 310 (holding that the President may find it neces-
sary to use electronic surveillance to obtain intelligence on
those foreign agents who conspire to harm the United States
government).
4 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ABOUT THE NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AGENCY: WHAT Is THE NSA?, at http://www.nsa.gov/
about.nsa/index.html (last visited January 12, 2003).
5 Sarah Ferguson, Overloading Big Brother, THE VILLAGE
VOICE, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/
9942/ferguson.php (Oct. 20-25, 1999).
6 Id. (explaining the motivation and plan behind hack-
tivists' "Jam Echelon Day").
7 Jeffrey Richelson, Desperately Seeking Signals, BULLETIN
LON is whether this global communications inter-
ceptor infringes upon the Fourth Amendment's
guarantees of protection from unreasonable
search and seizure.
7
This issue now must be analyzed in light of the
World Trade Center and Pentagon tragedies of
September 11, 2001.8 These tragic events have led
Americans to reevaluate the debate between pri-
vacy and national security in a new context. Gone
are the days when "Big Brother" was the only con-
cern that Americans had in regard to the govern-
ment's use of electronic surveillance. Americans
are now faced with questions that will substantially
affect the manner in which they view their funda-
mental constitutional rights. Americans must ask
if they will tolerate government surveillance
through the use of technologies, such as ECHE-
LON, used in the hopes of detecting, preventing
and apprehending terrorist threats to the United
States. Americans must also ask if they are willing
to surrender some personal privacy in order to
strengthen both national security and their knowl-
edge that chances of another September 1 1th oc-
curring during their lifetimes will be substantially
reduced.
Citizens and inhabitants of the United States
OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, available at http://bullatomsci.
org/issues/2000/maOO/maOOrichelson.html (Mar./Apr.
2000) [hereinafter Richelson] (raising the issue of "Big
Brother" and government surveillance and the feeling of a
lack of privacy that these surveillance techniques have in-
stilled in the American people. This article also provides the
historical and technical background of ECHELON and
claims that the NSA has not been adequately able to keep up
with evolving technological breakthroughs in its operation of
intelligence gathering for national security purposes).
8 See N.R. Kleinfeld, U.S. Attacked; Hijacked Jets Destroy
Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon In A Day of Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
September 12, 2001, at Al (describing the terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001).
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may not realize that systems such as ECHELON
do not require them to make this sacrifice, be-
cause the NSA must strictly adhere to legal stan-
dards when conducting electronic surveillance ac-
tivities. However, in the wake of the September
11, 2001 tragedies, it may be beneficial for the
NSA to know that it has the support of those it
seeks to protect and that the controversy sur-
rounding ECHELON may subside for years to
come. The more Americans realize that national
security allows them to realize their rights and
privileges, the more likely it is that they will toler-
ate the slim prospect that their privacy may be in-
fringed upon in the operation of ECHELON.
This Comment seeks to lay forth the legal
framework in which the NSA operates and to es-
tablish that the NSA is not permitted to conduct
domestic surveillance on the general populace.
Part I of this Comment provides the purposes and
powers of the NSA. Part II goes into detail as to
how the technological aspects of ECHELON oper-
ate. Part III explains the legal guidelines of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Constitution, with which the NSA
must comply in its operation of technological sur-
veillance. Part IV discusses the main concerns sur-
rounding the operation of ECHELON. This Com-
ment focuses on allegations of domestic surveil-
lance and invasion of privacy, but will not address
the highly debated issue of economic espionage?'
Lastly, this Comment will analyze the technologi-
cal aspects of ECHELON in the context of the es-
9 See Michael Mosier, Note, Causes of Action for Foreign Vic-
tims of Economic Espionage Abroad by U.S. Intelligence, 11 DUKEJ.
COMP. & INT'L L. 427, 427-29 (2001) (claiming that ECHE-
LON is used for economic espionage purposes for which for-
eign individuals have no recourse).
10 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, NSA AND THE INTELLI-
GENCE COMMUNITY 1, at http://www.nsa.gov/about-nsa/nsa_
role.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2000) [hereinafter NSA AND
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY] (providing information as to
how the NSA was established and where it fits into the intelli-
gence community).
11 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, MISSION STATEMENT 1, at
http://www.nsa.gov/aboutnsa/mission.html (last visited
Nov. 19, 2000) [hereinafter MISSION STATEMENT] (stating
that the Information Assurance mission provides "the solu-
tions, products and services, and conducts defensive informa-
tion operations, to achieve information assurance for infor-
mation infrastructures critical to U.S. national security inter-
ests, " whereas the signals intelligence mission "allows for an
effective, unified organization and control of all the foreign
signals collection and processing activities of the United
States").
12 NSA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, supra note 10,
tablished statutory and administrative guidelines
governing its operation, and, in doing so, will seek
to provide assurance that the NSA complies with
applicable legal requirements in its maintenance
and operation of ECHELON.
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
The NSA was established by President Harry S.
Truman's directive in 1952 to provide both signals
intelligence and communications security activi-
ties to the government.' 0 The present-day NSA
has a twofold mission: to protect United States in-
formation systems and to produce foreign signals
intelligence information.'' To achieve these
objectives, the NSA works in conjunction with the
Central Security Service 12 and various other gov-
ernment organizations to gather intelligence in-
formation. ' 4 The NSA claims that it strictly follows
the laws and regulations designed to protect
United States' citizens' Fourth Amendment rights
and that it therefore performs signals intelligence
operations only against foreign powers or agents
of foreign powers, not against citizens or inhabi-
tants of the United States.
14
There are judicial, statutory and administrative
safeguards that regulate the NSA's collection of
signals intelligence. These safeguards are de-
signed to balance the government's need for for-
eign intelligence information with the privacy
rights afforded to United States citizens under the
Fourth Amendment. 15 The NSA also has an inter-
nal process overseen by the Office of the Inspec-
at I (stating that the "CSS was established in 1972 to provide
cryptologic activities within the military." This article does
not focus on the NSA's information assurance mission).
13 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS at http://www.nsa.gov/about-nsa/faqsinternet.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2000) [hereinafter NSA FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS] (listing the twelve other organizations in
the intelligence community, including: Central Intelligence
Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, Defense Intelligence Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, Department of Energy, Army Intelli-
gence, Air Force Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Marine
Corps Intelligence, Department of Treasury and Department
of State).
14 Id. (providing information on the guidelines and fo-
cus of the collection of signals intelligence).
15 Id. (stating that the House Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence ensure that the NSA adheres to applicable laws
and regulations); but see generally Lawrence D. Sloan, Note,
ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need
for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467, 1503-05 (2001) (alleging
that ECHELON's ability to collect nearly all signals makes its
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tor General ("OIG"), whose responsibility is to en-
sure that the NSA complies with Executive Order
12,333 and related implementing directives and
regulations in its execution of intelligence-gather-
ing operations. 16 Executive Order 12,333 provides
the NSA and the other members of the intelli-
gence community with responsibilities and appro-
priate procedures to which to adhere in collecting
intelligence and counterintelligence informa-
tion.
1 7
Now that the foundation for the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the NSA in its collection of intelli-
gence and counterintelligence information has
been laid, we will explore the technology behind
ECHELON and its operation.
III. BACKGROUND OF ECHELON
A. General Framework
ECHELON is an automated global satellite-
based interception and relay system operated by
the intelligence agencies of five nations: the
United States, Britain, New Zealand, Australia and
Canada ("UKUSA countries").' This telecommu-
nications spy network intercepts all means of com-
operation a direct violation of the statutory framework of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Fourth Amend-
ment because it does not comply with the warrant and proba-
ble cause elements of the Fourth Amendment and that ECH-
ELON is a device used to conduct domestic surveillance).
16 NSA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 13.
17 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. §200 (1982), re-
printed in 50 U.S.C. §401 (1994).
18 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREEDOM NETWORK,
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) ABOUT
ECHELON, at http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/faq.html
(last modified Oct. 15, 2001) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS] (explaining the technical aspects of ECHELON,
how it is operated, what kind of information it intercepts and
what is done with the intercepted information. The article
elaborates on the technical aspect of ECHELON by claiming
that there is no governmental oversight in its operation); but
see generally Legal Standards for the Intelligence Community in Con-
ducting Electronic Surveillance, at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/
standards.html [hereinafter Legal Standards] (establishing the
legal basis and constitutionality of ECHELON's existence).
19 Patrick S. Poole, ECHELON: America's Secret Global Sur-
veillance Network at http://fly.hiwaay.net/-pspoole/echelon.
html (last visited Nov. 19, 2001) [hereinafter ECHELON:
America's Secret Global Surveillance Network] (discussing the
UKUSA agreement between the United States, Australia, Ca-
nada, New Zealand and Britain. Poole states that Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and Britain are considered the "Sec-
ond Parties" to the agreement. There are also "Third Party
Members" including Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea
and Turkey).
20 Id.
munication and their respective data twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week. The data is
processed and, if necessary, is sent to the appro-
priate UKUSA country. 19
The five agencies that are active participants in
the interception, analysis and redistribution of
ECHELON-gathered intelligence are the United
States' NSA, Britain's Government Communica-
tions Headquarters ("GCHQ"), New Zealand's
Government Communications Headquarters
("GCSB"), Australia's Defense Signals Directorate
("DSD") and Canada's Communications Security
Establishment ("CSE").20 Each of the agencies has
a regional allocation for which it is responsible.
2 1
These five agencies work together to ensure
that ECHELON is intercepting all satellite, micro-
wave, cellular and fiber-optic traffic at any given
moment.2 2 It has been estimated that ECHELON
intercepts "as many as 3 billion communications
every day, including phone calls, e-mail messages,
Internet downloads [and] satellite transmis-
sions."
23
ECHELON was the offspring of the 1947
UKUSA agreement, which defined the relations
between the signals intelligence ("SIGINT") 24 de-
21 Duncan Campbell, Somebody's Listening, at http://www.
gn.apc.org/duncan/echelon-dc.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2001) [hereinafter Somebody's Listening] (exposing the tech-
nology of ECHELON to the general public for the first time,
Campbell explains ECHELON's capabilities and describes
the technological forefathers of electronic surveillance).
Campbell also determined the separate jurisdictions of which
each government agency is in charge. GCHQ is the coordi-
nating center for Europe, Africa and Russia. The NSA covers
parts of Eastern Europe and most of North and South
America. Australia coordinates the electronic monitoring of
the South Pacific and South East Asia. Id.
22 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREEDOM NETWORK,
ACLU URGES CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE ECHELON SURVEI-
LANCE SYSTEM, at http://www.aclu.org/congress/lg040699a.
html (last visited Nov. 19, 2001) [hereinafter ACLU LETTER]
(claiming that the interception of these forms of communica-
tion is a direct violation of the fights of United States persons
because the National Security Agency is allegedly conducting
domestic surveillance).
23 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 18.
24 Duncan Campbell, Interception Capabilities 2000 6, at
http://www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/ic2kreport.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Interception Capabilities] (ex-
plaining that communications intelligence deals with techni-
cal and intelligence information derived from foreign com-
munications by those other than the intended recipient and
is included in the broader category of signals intelligence
which also includes the collection of non-communications
signals such as radar emissions). This article was part of the
Scientific and Technical Options Assessment report released
by the British Parliament for the purpose of alerting the
20031
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partments of the five participating governments. 25
The UKUSA agreement originally was enacted to
protect against U.S.S.R.'s arms build-up during
the Cold War.26 However, the countries decided
to expand their signals and communications intel-
ligence efforts by developing technologically ad-
vanced capabilities to ward off not only Russian
enemies, but any threat to the safety of the
UKUSA nations.
27
This is where ECHELON came in. ECHELON
allegedly came into existence in the 1970's, but
has only recently been acknowledged by any of
the UKUSA nations. 28 To this day, the United
States denies the existence of ECHELON despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.2
9
ECHELON has a very complex, technological
and precise method of gathering data. The inter-
ception process captures all data from e-mail
transmissions, telephone calls and fax transmis-
sions.30 Therefore, the communications that are
captured consist of vocal conversations, as well as
transmissions containing written data.31 These in-
terceptions are designed to capture non-military
communications of governments, private organi-
world that the NSA conducts illegal surveillance including
commercial espionage. Id.
25 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19 (explaining the United Kingdom/United
States of America "UKUSA" agreement as stemming from the
BRUSA alliance formed during World War 1I. The UKUSA
agreement defined the relations between the signals intelli-
gence departments of the five governments and was a prod-
uct of the Commonwealth SIGINT Organization formed in
1946-47).
26 See Interception Capabilities, supra note 24, at 6 (stating
that the NSA has reaffirmed a present need for signals intelli-
gence after the necessity seemed to have disappeared follow-
ing the Cold War).
27 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19 (claiming that the rise of terrorism gave the
NSA the justification it needed to develop ECHELON).
28 Richelson, supra note 7 (stating that Australia and Ca-
nada have recently issued statements acknowledging for the
first time their participation in the UKUSA alliance).
29 See Richard Barry, ECHELON: The Evidence, 1, at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,s2079850,00.html (June
29, 2000) (claiming that there is ample evidence supporting
the existence of ECHELON, including documentation and
oral statements made by government agents. Barry also
claims that the primary concern about ECHELON's exis-
tence is that it allegedly aids the NSA and CIA in the acquisi-
tion of information for commercial espionage).
30 Niall McKay, Did EU Scuttle Echelon Debate?, WIRED.COM,
at http://wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,15429,00.html
(Oct. 5, 1998) (alleging that the reason why the European
Parliament did not investigate ECHELON further after re-
ceiving the STOA reports was because they feared jeopardiz-
ing relations between the European Union and the United
zations, businesses and private individuals on be-
half of these nations.3 2 The interception process
is divided into three stages: the collection of intel-




One way in which ECHELON collects commu-
nication transmissions is via large satellite dishes
located at various points around the world.34
These dishes are aimed at satellites orbiting the
Earth that transmit telephone and fax communi-
cations between civilians. This information is in
turn funneled through the ground dishes from
these satellites.
35
The second source of ECHELON-gathered
communications is the United States satellite net-
work and its reception bases that are scattered
throughout the United States, Canada, New Zea-
land, Britain and Australia.- 6 This network deals
with signals intelligence rather than the afore-
mentioned, and not as high-tech, interception of
satellite communications. 37 The United States'
States).
31 See id.
32 Richelson, supra note 7, at 1.
33 Rupert Goodwins, Echelon: How it Works 1-3, at http://
news.zdnet.co.uk/story/printer/0,,s2079849,00.html (June
29, 2000) (arguing that despite ECHELON's impressive and
highly technical design, it is still not sufficient to keep up
with the new technologies of encryption and wireless tech-
nology that make communications virtually impossible to col-
lect and analyze).
34 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19.
The Morenstow [satellite] station directs its ears towards
the Intelsats traversing the atmosphere above the Atlan-
tic and Indian Oceans and transmitting to Europe, Af-
rica and western parts of Asia. The Yakima station...
targets Pacific Ocean communications in the Northern
Hemisphere, as well as the Far East. Another NSA facility
at Sugar Grove, West Virginia, covers traffic for the
whole of North and South America. A DSD station at
Geraldton, Australia, and the Waihopai, New Zealand
GCSB facility cover Asia, the South Pacific countries and
the Pacific Ocean. An additional station on Ascension
Island in the Atlantic Ocean... is suspected of covering
the Atlantic Intelsat's Southern Hemisphere communi-
cations.
Id.
35 Id. (stating that the satellite interceptions occasionally
carry diplomatic and governmental communications, but
only on rare occasions).
36 Id.
37 Richelson, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that communica-
tions interceptions occur through the use of ground dishes
that intercept using the old fashioned method of eavesdrop-
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satellite network is far more sweeping than the
network of previously mentioned satellites be-
cause it gathers information from e-mail and cell
phone transmissions, in addition to phone and
fax transmissions. 3  Internet and e-mail intercep-
tions require the use of a complex technological
device that is not required to parlay ordinary
phone and fax signal interceptions to the NSA.
39
Even though the ECHELON listening stations
are located on foreign soil, the NSA is primarily
responsible for the American-owned downlink sta-
tions. 40 The downlink, or reception stations, con-
sist of radomes, which are enormous golf-ball-like
structures that contain satellite dishes and other
listening equipment. 41 The radomes capture in-
formation that is then poured into memory buff-
ers capable of storing five trillion pages of data at
NSA's headquarters.
42
C. Analysis and Dissemination
After the satellite dishes capture the signals,
they are then sent to a large computer network
for analysis. This network consists of many state-
of-the-art computers that "decrypt, filter, examine
ping, whereas signals intelligence is operated by the usage of
satellites intercepting communications and relaying them to
the ground stations); see also Interception Capabilities, supra
note 24, at 5 (defining communications intelligence as "tech-
nical and intelligence information derived from foreign com-
munications by other than the intended recipient." Commu-
nications intelligence ("Comint") is a major component of
signals intelligence ("SIGINT"), which "also includes the col-
lection of non-communications signals such as radar emis-
sions.").
38 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19, at 6.
39 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 18, at 2.
40 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19.
41 David Ruppe, Big Ears and Big Secrets, ABCNEWS.coM,
at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/
Echelon 990709.html (July 16, 2000) [hereinafter Ruppe]
(stating that the radomes located at Menwith Hill in York-
shire, England download information from various satellites
that conduct surveillance of Europe, North Africa and west-
ern Asia. Ruppe also commented that the European Parlia-
ment's STOA report put fear in all Europeans that the
United States also engages in industrial espionage to defeat
European competitors in major trade competitions).
42 Vernon Loeb, Test of Strength, WASHINGTONPOST.COM at
http:www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/style/postmagazine/
A44781-2001Ju124.html (July 29, 2001) (explaining a largely
unknown security crisis in the United States, due to a system
failure at the NSA).
43 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19 (explaining the various technologies that work
in conjunction with ECHELON to provide the NSA with in-
and codify" the intercepted messages during the
analysis process through the use of programs that
have optical character recognition and voice rec-
ognition capabilities. 43 The NSA and its UKUSA
partners are mainly concerned with any form of
communication that could pose a threat to their
national security. 44 The determination of whether
the intercepted information will be removed from
the network prior to analysis or remain in the sys-
tem for further investigation depends on the con-
tents of dictionaries supplied by the five nations.
45
The dictionaries can be found in computers
supplied by each of the five UKUSA countries that
contain a list of keywords whose appearance raises
a red flag for its corresponding country. 46 If an
intercepted message is red-flagged, it then is auto-
matically transcribed, assigned a four-digit code,
recorded by the system and forwarded to the in-
terested country's computer. 47 The agents at the
receiving site then analyze the message further to
determine whether it is a threat to national secur-
ity. Often, the messages that are red-flagged are
nothing more than innocent conversations and
do not have substantial merit as threats to na-
tional security.48
telligence information). SILKWORTH is the main computer
system at the Menwith Hill facility that drives the keyword
search programs. PATHFINDER is a tool that "sifts through
large databases of text-based documents and messages look-
ing for keywords and phrases based on complex algorithmic
criteria." VOICECAST is able to pinpoint an individual's
voice pattern so that every call that a person makes is tran-
scribed and analyzed. Id.
44 See Richelson, supra note 7.
45 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19 (stating that very few messages are actually tran-
scribed and recorded by the system); but see Ex-Snoop Confirms
Echelon Network, CBSNEWS.coM, at http://cbsnews.com (Feb.
12, 2001) [hereinafter Ex-Snoop Confirms Echelon Network]
(concluding that ECHELON intercepts and analyzes all elec-
tronic communications, including those from the "good




48 See Erin Zimmerman and Dale Hurd, Surveillance Soci-
ety: Exposing Echelon, at http://www.christianity.com/CC/ar-
ticle/1,1 183,PTID2546%7CCHID%7CCI1D136183,00.html
[hereinafter Zimmerman & Hurd] (stating that ECHELON
intercepts over two million communications every hour); see
also Ex-Snoop Confirms Echelon Network, supra note 45 (recal-
ling a situation in which a woman's communication was inter-
cepted and red-flagged because she told a friend on the
phone that her son had "bombed" in a school play. The sys-
tem alerted the analysts to this communication, and there-




This system is quite efficient despite the over-
whelming amount of intercepted data because it
allows users to focus on a specific subject.49 If a
red flag is not raised when the network examines
the message, the message will automatically fall
out of the system without wasting time and re-
sources.
50
IV. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING
ECHELON
The debate over the legality and constitutional-
ity of ECHELON's existence and operation came
to Congress' attention in 1988, when a whistle-
blower stationed at the Menwith Hill Facility in
England during the 1980s was interviewed by the
Cleveland Plain Dealer.51 The whistleblower, Mar-
garet Newsham, filed a lawsuit concerning corrup-
tion and misspending on United States govern-
ment black projects, claiming that she overheard
real-time intercepts of Senator Strom Thur-
mond's telephone conversations. 52 This lawsuit
raised fears that the NSA conducted domestic sur-
veillance of Americans, over which it had no juris-
diction. 5
3
In addition to Ms. Newsham's lawsuit, the Sci-
entific and Technical Options Assessment pro-
gram office ("STOA") of the European Parlia-
ment released two reports, "An Appraisal of Tech-
nologies of Political Control" and "Interception
Capabilities 2000," that describe the capabilities
of American surveillance and ECHELON. 54 Both
49 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 18 (stating
that the dictionaries allow the system to work more efficiently
because they provide ECHELON with key words, addresses,
and the like that are to be flagged for inspection); see also
Interception Capabilities, supra note 24, at 18 (explaining that
the dictionary computers store a database of specified targets
including names, topics, addresses, telephone numbers and
the like).
50 See Richelson, supra note 7.
51 ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network,
supra note 19.
52 See Somebody's Listening, supra note 21.
53 See Zimmerman & Hurd, supra note 48 (claiming that
the five-country partnership that runs ECHELON creates a
legal loophole in which no country has to spy on its own citi-
zens, but is able to receive intercepted information pertain-
ing to their own citizens, from another UKUSA country).
54 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 18 (stating
that due to the STOA reports, the European Parliament
formed a temporary committee of Enquiry to investigate
ECHELON. In May 2001, committee members were sched-
tiled to meet with NSA and CIA personnel to discuss ECHE-
LON, but the meetings were never realized).
reports were prepared to provide the European
Parliament with a guide to technological advance-
ments, while developing policy recommendations
for the operation and control of technologies
such as ECHELON. 5 The first report, released in
1998, suggested that ECHELON indiscriminately
intercepts large amounts of communications, in-
cluding economic intelligence, constituting mal-
practice and negligence. 56 "Interception Capabili-
ties 2000," written by British investigative journal-
ist Duncan Campbell, contained accusations from
the French government that the NSA uses ECHE-
LON for industrial and commercial espionage.
57
In response to this report, the French govern-
ment issued a decree encouraging the public to
use more powerful encryption to disable the inter-
ception capabilities of ECHELON.
5
1
The STOA reports prompted action from the
American Civil Liberties Union, who brought it to
Congress' attention that the NSA and its elec-
tronic surveillance operations needed to be ex-
amined to ensure that Americans' privacy rights
were not being willfully invaded by the NSA.
59
Congressman Bob Barr led the Congressional
movement to force the NSA to account for the
fact that United States citizens' communications
are intercepted by ECHELON in the name of na-
tional security.60 The NSA eventually submitted
the legal standards to which it adheres in the in-
terception of communications, but did so without
ever acknowledging the existence of ECHE-
LON." 1
55 ACLU LETTER, supra note 22.
56 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 18 (claim-
ing that domestic surveillance and economic espionage are
an unacceptable and illegal use of ECHELON).
57 Id.
58 See Ruppe, supra note 41.
59 See ACLU LETTER, supra note 22 (describing ECHE-
LON to the House Committee on Government Reform. The
letter also raised allegations of the role of ECHELON in do-
mestic surveillance, and its violation of United States citizens'
civil liberties inder the Fourth Amendment).
60 See Zimmerman & Hurd, supra note 48 (pointing out
that Congressman Barr asked the NSA to supply the Ameri-
can people with basic information regarding the NSA's legal
basis for intercepting communications. Barr eventually
pushed a bill through the House requiring the NSA, CIA and
Attorney General to supply the House Select Committee on
Intelligence with this information); see also AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, FREEDOM NETWORK, ECHELONWATCH:
UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, at http://www.aclu.
org/echelonwatch/congress.html (describing the process
through which H.R. 1555 was passed).
61 See generally Legal Standards, supra note 18.
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V. LEGAL GUIDELINES
ECHELON's astounding ability to intercept sat-
ellite-based communications leaves an impression
on Americans that they are the objects of govern-
ment surveillance. 62 However, the NSA must ad-
here to strict rules in the operation of its elec-
tronic surveillance equipment. ECHELON is sub-
ject to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, which requires reasonable-
ness and probable cause for searches and
seizures. 63 ECHELON is also subject to strict regu-
lation by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978,64 as well as Executive Order 12,333,65
which deal with intelligence gathering and sur-
veillance in terms of national defense. Lastly, the
NSA has provided Congress with its own set of le-
gal guidelines that apply to its operation and use
of ECHELON. 66 These internal guidelines incor-
porate the standards of the Fourth Amendment,
FISA and Executive Order 12,333.
A. Legal Standards for the Intelligence
Community
ECHELON has recently come into the spotlight
under a cloud of suspicion and fear, causing au-
thorities to question the legality and constitution-
ality of its existence. 67 Congressman Bob Barr ini-
tiated hearings to determine whether United
States' signals intelligence activities are violating
the privacy rights of Americans. 68 In April 2000,
the House Intelligence Committee held a hearing
to deal with these allegations and suspicions aris-
ing from ECHELON's alleged existence and oper-
62 See Erin Zimmerman and Dale Hurd, Surveillance Soci-
ety: A Spy's Story, at http://www.christianity.com/CC/article/
1,1 178,PTID2546%7CCHID%7CCIID 136183,00.html.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. §2511, 2518-2520,
47 U.S.C. §605-606, 50 U.S.C. §1801-1811 (1994)).
65 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. §200 (1982), re-
printed in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
66 Legal Standards, supra note 18.
67 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREEDOM NETWORK,
SUPER-SECRET GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM EAVESDROPS ON
CONVERSATIONS WORLDWIDE, at http://www.aclu.org/action/
echelon107.html [hereinafter ACLU ALERT] (stating that
concerned groups include the European Parliament, mem-
bers of Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union and
United States citizens).
68 Richelson, supra note 7.
69 ACLU ALERT, supra note 67.
70 See Richelson, supra note 7.
ation. The Committee hoped that the hearing
would rebut the assumption that ECHELON cir-
cumvents the federal requirement that it is neces-
sary to obtain a warrant prior to eavesdropping on
communications involving United States "per-
sons," a term which refers to both citizens and
non-citizen inhabitants.
69
Congressman Porter Goss of Florida, the Re-
publican Chair of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, requested that the
NSA disclose its legal standards to the commit-
tee.70 The NSA invoked the attorney-client privi-
lege and refused disclosure of the requested infor-
mation.71 In response, Congressman Barr pro-
posed a bill that would require the NSA to dis-
close to Congress the legal standards that apply to
the operation of ECHELON.
72
Subsequently, the House of Representatives
amended a bill7 3 authorizing funds for intelli-
gence operations. The amendments required the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the NSA and the Attorney General to
prepare a report disclosing the legal standards for
gathering intelligence via electronic surveillance.
The bill passed both houses of Congress, but the
Senate version required only a report and did not
require full disclosure of all signals intelligence
activities.7
4
President Clinton signed the Senate version
into law as an intelligence community funding
bill-the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000. 75 This act required disclosure reports
from the NSA, CIA and the Attorney General to
include the legal standards for the: interception
71 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 18.
72 See Zimmerman & Hurd, supra note 48 (reciting the
question that Bob Barr posed to the NSA:
There seems to be very credible evidence that this opera-
tion is taking place, and has been taking place for quite
some time. At this point, all we're asking for is the basic
information telling us what do you at the NSA, the Na-
tional Security Agency, believe is the legal basis for you
to gather this information? That's the starting point:
What's the basis that you believe you're authorized to do
this?).
73 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREEDOM NETWORK,
UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, at http://www.aclu.
org/echelonwatch/congress.html (providing the process of
H.R. 1555 being passed by both the House and the Senate,
and stating the requirements imposed on the NSA and CIA
in response to the Bill).
74 Id.
75 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-120, 309, 113 Stat. 1606, 1613.
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of communications when such interception may
result in the acquisition of information from a
communication to or from United States persons;
intentional targeting of the communications to or
from United States persons; receipt from non-
United States sources of information pertaining
to communications to or from United States per-
sons; and dissemination of information acquired
through the interception of the communications
to or from United States persons.
76
In the NSA's report to Congress, titled "Legal
Standards for the Intelligence Community in
Conducting Electronic Surveillance, ' 7 7 the NSA
stated that its internal legal standards are gov-
erned by the Fourth Amendment,7 FISA,79 and
by Executive Order 12,333.80 Further, the NSA
stated that it abides by the FISA requirements of
prior judicial notice and probable cause in con-
ducting electronic surveillance that either targets
United States persons or may result in the acquisi-
tion of information involving them.8 ' The NSA
also reported that incidentally-acquired informa-
tion about a United States person who is not an
approved target may be retained and dissemi-
nated if the communication is in regard to for-
eign intelligence or counterintelligence.8 2 The
standards also posit that the requirements for ob-
taining and utilizing information regarding a
United States person is governed by a much
stricter set of rules than in a situation in which the
parties are foreign. 3
If an electronic interception may result in inci-
dentally acquired information directed to or from
a United States person, both FISA and Executive
Order 12,333 apply, and the surveillance must be
conducted in a reasonable manner to ensure that
76 Id. at §309(b).
77 Legal Standards, supra note 18 (providing Congress
with the legal standards that the NSA, CIA and Attorney Gen-
eral adhere to in the conduction of intelligence information
gathering per the 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2511, 2518-2520, 47 U.S.C. §§605-
606, 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1811 (1994).
80 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. §200 (1982), reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. §401 (1994).
81 Legal Standards, supra note 18.
82 Id. (stating that they must still conduct their surveil-
lance in a manner that minimizes the acquisition, retention
and dissemination of information about incidentally ac-
quired communications pertaining to United States per-
sons); see also 50 U.S.C. §1801(h) (1994) (defining the mini-
mization procedures that must be followed in intelligence
a minimum amount of information is acquired re-
garding the United States person. If the inciden-
tally acquired information pertains to foreign in-
telligence, it may be disseminated.
8 4
Lastly, in order for the NSA to conduct proper
dissemination of information acquired about
United States persons, it must comply with FISA
and the minimization procedures therein. In or-
der to disseminate personally identifiable infor-
mation concerning a United States person, the in-
formation must be deemed necessary to under-
stand foreign intelligence.
8 5
In sum, the aforementioned legal standards for
electronic surveillance are governed by both a
statutory framework that governs foreign intelli-
gence collection and the procedures and restric-
tions that apply to the interception of foreign
communications, as well as Executive Order
12,333, which sets the guidelines for interception
of information dealing with a United States per-
son who is abroad at the time of surveillance. The
NSA states that it also abides by the Fourth
Amendment's necessary requirements of reasona-
bleness and probable cause in its surveillance and
communication interception activities.8 6 The fol-
lowing is a more detailed discussion of FISA, Ex-
ecutive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amend-
ment.
B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 ("FISA")
8 7
Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to further
United States counterintelligence and to deter-
mine who has the authority to engage in activities
that involve the interception of intelligence and
gathering surveillance operations).
83 Legal Standards, supra note 18 (stating that it is suffi-
cient in the case of a non-U.S. person to show that the infor-
mation to be acquired is merely related to the national de-
fense or security of the United States or the conduct of for-
eign affairs; where a United States person is involved, the
contents of the application must include a showing that the
acquisition of such information is necessary to national de-
fense or security or the conduct of foreign affairs).
84 Id. (providing the legal standards for receipt from
non-United States sources of information pertaining to com-
munication to or from United States persons).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2511, 2518-2520, 47 U.S.C. §605-606,
50 U.S.C. §§1801-1811 (1994)).
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what restrictions should apply to those activities.88
This act also was aimed at lessening the competi-
tion between the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") and the Department of Justice on the one
side and the CIA and other segments of the intel-
ligence community on the other side.8 9 The intel-
ligence community was viewed as a mysterious
group that answered to no one, and this charac-
terization made citizens nervous in regard to their
perceived lack of privacy.99
FISA allows the President, acting through the
Attorney General, to acquire foreign intelligence
information for periods up to one year, if the sur-
veillance is directed at intercepting communica-
tions between or among foreign powers. 91 FISA
states that the surveillance must not operate with
a substantial likelihood that the intercepted com-
munications would involve any United States per-
son.92 United States citizens' privacy rights are
protected by this act. The method of electronic
88 Gerald H. Robinson, We're Listening! Electronic Eaves-
dropping, FISA, and the Secret Court, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 51,
51-52 (2000) [hereinafter We're Listening.] (providing the
background and inception of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act and its court).
89 Id. at 52.
90 Id. (arguing that the FISA and its court are operated in
a crippling shadow of secrecy that makes it nearly impossible
for checks and balances to be brought against their opera-
tion in regard to ECHELON).
91 FISA defines "foreign power" as:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof
whether or not recognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substan-
tially composed of United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign
government or governments to be directed and con-
trolled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activi-
ties in preparation therefore;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substan-
tially composed of United States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign
government or governments
50 U.S.C. §1801(a) (1.994).
92 FISA defines an United States person as:
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, ...
an unincorporated association a substantial number of
members of which are citizens of the United States or
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a
corporation which is incorporated in the United States,
but does not include a corporation or an association
which is a foreign power.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (1994).
93 The minimization procedures with respect to elec-
tronic surveillance include:
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the
Attorney General that are reasonably designed in light
of the purpose and technique of the particular surveil-
lance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and
surveillance must be conducted in accordance
with the certifications and the minimization pro-
cedures93 adopted by the Attorney General. 4
These procedures allow the federal government
to use intercepted communications involving a
United States person only if they have complied
with the minimization procedures set out in the
act.
9 5
FISA has also established a specialized court,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISC"), with the purposes of reviewing Depart-
ment of Justice applications requesting the use of
electronic surveillance and issuing secret warrants
authorizing these activities. 96 Applications to this
court must adhere to a strict set of guidelines es-
tablished by FISA before the Department of Jus-
tice can expect FISC to grant its application.
97
The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court designates seven district court judges from
seven of the judicial circuits whose purpose is to
prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available in-
formation concerning unconsenting United States per-
sons consistent with the need of the United States to ob-
tain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence in-
formation;
(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available
information, which is not foreign intelligence informa-
tion, as defined in subsection (e) (1), shall not be dis-
seminated in a manner that identifies any United States
person, without such person's consent, unless such per-
son's identity is necessary to understand foreign intelli-
gence information or assess its importance;
(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), proce-
dures that allow for the retention and dissemination of
information that is evidence of a crime which has been,
is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be
retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes;
and
(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with
respect to any electronic surveillance approved pursuant
to 102(a) [50 U.S.C. § 1802 (a)], procedures that require
that no contents of any communication to which a
United States person is a party shall be disclosed, dissem-
inated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer
than twenty-four hours unless a court order under sec-
tion 105 [50 U.S.C. § 1805] is obtained or unless the At-
torney General determines that the information indi-
cates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any per-
son.
50 U.S.C. §1801(h) (1994).
94 50 U.S.C. §1802(a) (2) (1994).
95 See 50 U.S.C. §1801(h) (1994).
96 We're Listening, supra note 88, at 51 (providing statis-
tics concerning the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISC")).
97 See 50 U.S.C. §1804 (1994) (establishing the necessary
showing of a detailed application to FISC in the gathering of
intelligence information. This section makes it clear that the
necessary showings are very stringent even when foreign pow-
ers are the proposed targets).
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sit on the FISC bench and hear applications for,
and grant orders approving, electronic surveil-
lance for counterintelligence purposes. 98
The FISC will grant the application if the gov-
ernment has adhered to the stated guidelines,
compliance with which allows the court to make
certain findings required pursuant to FISA before
an application can be granted.99 The orders
themselves also must adhere to established specifi-
cations, often including a description of the target
of electronic surveillance, the nature and location
of the targeted surveillance, the type of informa-
tion sought and the allotted time to conduct the
surveillance.' 00 However, if the target is solely
comprised of foreign powers, certain information
may be excluded from the order.101 Orders may
also be granted on an emergency basis without all
of the aforementioned formalities, while still
utilizing the minimization procedures if the infor-
98 50 U.S.C. §1803(a) (1994).
99 To issue an order, the FISC must first make the neces-
sary findings of:
(1) the President has authorized the Attorney General
to approve applications for electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence information;
(2) the application has been made by a Federal officer
and approved by the Attorney General;
(3) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant
there is probable cause to believe that -
(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power or an agent of a for-
eign power solely upon the basis of activities protected
by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States; and
(B) each of the facilities or places at which the elec-
tronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is abused,
or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power;
(4) the proposed minimization procedures meet the
definition of minimization procedures under section
104(h) [50 U.S.C. §1804(h)]; and
(5) the application which has been filed contains all
statements and certifications required by section 104 [50
U.S.C. §1804] and, if the target is a United States per-
son, the certification or certifications are not clearly er-
roneous on the basis of the statement made under sec-
tion 104(a)(7)(E) [50 U.S.C. §1804(a)(7)(E)] and any
other information furnished under section 104(d) [50
U.S.C. §1804(d)].
50 U.S.C. §1805(a) (1994).
100 50 U.S.C. §1805(c) (1994).
101 50 U.S.C. §1805(d) (1994).
102 FISA authorizes emergency orders when the Attorney
General reasonably determines that:
(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the
employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign
intelligence information before an order authorizing
such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained;
and
(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this
mation sought indicates a threat of death or seri-
ous bodily harm to any person
1 2
If the FISC denies an application, the govern-
ment can move for review by a panel of three
judges who are designated by the Chief Justice. If
the court of review affirms the denial of the appli-
cation, the government may petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States. 103
C. Executive Order 12,333104
Executive Order 12,333 was issued in 1981 by
President Reagan with the purpose of establishing
the policies and procedures to which each partici-
pant in the intelligence community must adhere
in the collection, retention and dissemination of
intelligence information. 10 5 The Order estab-
lishes the framework in which the government
title to approve such surveillance exists; he may author-
ize the emergency employment of electronic surveil-
lance if a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 is
informed by the Attorney General of his designee at the
time of such authorization that the decision has been
made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and
if an application in accordance with this title is made to
that judge as soon as practicable, but no more that
twenty-four hours after the Attorney General authorizes
such surveillance. If the Attorney General authorizes
such emergency employment of electronic surveillance,
he shall require that the minimization procedures re-
quired by this title for the issuance of ajudicial order be
followed. In the absence of a judicial order... the sur-
veillance shall terminate when the information sought is
obtained, when the application for the order is denied,
or after the expiration of twenty-four hours from the
time of authorization by the Attorney General, which-
ever is earliest. In the event that such application for ap-
proval is denied, or in any other case where the elec-
tronic surveillance is terminated and no order is issued
approving the surveillance, no information obtained or
evidence derived from such surveillance shall be re-
ceived in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court...
or any authority of the United States... and no informa-
tion concerning any United States person acquired from
such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed
in any other manner by Federal officers or employees
without the consent of such person, except with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General if the information indi-
cates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any per-
son. A denial of the application under this subsection
may be reviewed as provided in section 103.
50 U.S.C. §1805(f) (1994).
103 50 U.S.C. §1803(b) (1994).
104 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. §200 (1982), re-
printed in 50 U.S.C. §401 (1994).
105 United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan,
557 F. Supp. 61, 66 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that Executive
Order 12,333 is Constitutional).
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and its agencies are to gather foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence information and the
manner in which the information collection will
be conducted in the United States and abroad. 10 6
The Order sought to strike a balance between the
Fourth Amendment rights of United States per-
sons with the need for an effective national secur-
ity regime able to protect the United States from
"international terrorist and international narcot-
ics activities, and other hostile activities directed
against the United States by foreign powers, orga-
nizations, persons, and their agents."
10 7
The Order's goal was to "enhance human and
technical collection techniques, especially those
undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of signifi-
cant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection
and countering of international terrorist activities
and espionage conducted by foreign powers." 108
The Order also stated that the collection of intelli-
gence is a "priority objective and will be pursued
in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner
that is consistent with the Constitution." 10
9
Executive Order 12,333 authorized the NSA to
collect, retain and disseminate information per-
taining to United States persons if the procedures
are authorized by the Attorney General, and the
information constitutes foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence not otherwise obtainable.""
Under this Order, the NSA may also collect infor-
106 Id. at 62.
107 Exec. Order No. 12,333 §1.4 states:
The agencies within the Intelligence Community shall,
in accordance with applicable United States law and with
the other provisions of this Order, conduct intelligence
activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations
and the protection of the national security of the United
States, including:
(a) Collection of information needed by the President,
the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State
and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for
the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
(b) Production and dissemination of intelligence;
(c) Collection of information concerning, and the con-
duct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities
directed against the United States, international terrorist
and international narcotics activities, and other hostile
activities directed against the United States by foreign
powers, organizations, persons, and their agents;
(d) Special activities;
(e) Administrative and support activities within the
United States and abroad necessary for the performance
of authorized activities; and
(f) Such other intelligence activities as the President
may direct from time to time.
Exec. Order No. 12,333 §1.4 (1982).
mation incidentally acquired that indicates in-
volvement in activities that may violate federal,
state, local or foreign laws.1
The NSA must, in accordance with this Order,
use the least intrusive means authorized by the At-
torney General in the collection, retention and
dissemination of intelligence information in the
United States or directed at United States persons
abroad.' 12 Executive Order 12,333 also states that
the NSA may not conduct physical surveillance of
a United States person abroad to collect foreign
intelligence unless the information is significant
and cannot be reasonably acquired by other avail-
able means." 3
Executive Order 12,333 gives the Attorney Gen-
eral power to approve the use of electronic sur-
veillance within the United States or against a
United States person abroad if it is determined
that there is probable cause to believe that the
"technique is directed against a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power."114 In authorizing
electronic surveillance, the Attorney General
must also comply with FISA. Since FISA pertains
to electronic surveillance of United States persons
as well as foreign countries, FISA is much more
comprehensive than Executive Order 12,333,
which only deals with United States persons lo-
cated abroad and/or United States persons acting
as foreign agents.
115
108 The stated purpose of Executive Order 12,333 is:
to enhance human and technical collection techniques,
especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition
of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detec-
tion and countering of international terrorist activities
and espionage conducted by foreign powers.
Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.2 (1982).
109 Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.1 (1982).
110 See Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.3(b) (1982) (stating
that foreign intelligence collection may not be undertaken
for the purpose of spying on American citizens).
I II Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.3(i) (1982).
112 Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.4 provides:
Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as
electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search,
mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring
devices unless they are in accordance with procedures
established by the head of the agency concerned and ap-
proved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall
protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit
the use of such information to lawful government pur-
poses.
Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.4 (1982).
113 Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.4(d) (1982).
114 Exec. Order No. 12,333 §2.5 (1982).
115 See Exec. Order No. 12,333 (1982).
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D. The Fourth Amendment
The most prominent argument leveled against
ECHELON is that the NSA, in its operation of
ECHELON, violates American citizens' civil liber-
ties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.1 1 6
The government's participation in electronic
surveillance was first considered in light of the
Fourth Amendment's provisions in Olmstead v.
United States. 1 7 The issue in Olmstead was whether
the use of private telephone conversations inter-
cepted by means of wiretapping was in violation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." 8 The defen-
dant argued that wiretapping his phone lines to
gain evidence of an alleged conspiracy, in viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act, was a tres-
pass upon his property and comparable to break-
ing and entering his home to steal letters. 119 In
contrast, the government contended that the case
was more analogous to a situation in which a fed-
eral officer overheard a conversation on the
street.1
20
Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the
116 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
t18 Id. at 455.
119 Id. at 460-65 (comparing Olmstead's situation to
cases that have found that letters are protected from unrea-
sonable search under the Fourth Amendment); see also Ex
ParteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that "letters
and sealed packages... in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection.., as if they were retained by the
parties forwarding them in their own domiciles").
120 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-65 (claiming that eavesdrop-
ping in public does not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
cause there is no invasion of one's right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers or effects); see also Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1942) (holding that the
government's use of a detactaphone (a high-tech micro-
phone) to listen in on one's conversation from an adjacent
apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it
did not amount to an interception of the conversation).
121 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that it was uncon-
stitutional for the police to intercept mail without a warrant
because it amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure).
The Court reasoned that:
if letters and private documents can thus be seized and
held and used as evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment de-
claring his right to be secure against such searches and
Court, which examined past precedent for search
and seizure cases. The Court's opinion relied on
Weeks v. United States121 in conjunction with the
history of the Fourth Amendment. l2 2 It held that
the Founders would not have wanted the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment to be stretched
beyond the practical meaning of the words. 123
Therefore, the Constitution was not violated un-
less there had been "an official search and seizure
of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or
his tangible material effects, or an actual physical
invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the pur-
pose of making a seizure.' 24 The Olmstead court
ultimately found that the government's use of a
wiretap on the defendant's phone line did not
amount to a search or seizure, and therefore did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.
2 5
Justice Brandeis entered a powerful dissent. He
contended that the issue of privacy is an ever-
evolving condition that the Founders took into ac-
count while drafting the Fourth Amendment.
126
He argued that the Constitution must be able to
evolve with changing circumstances and new tech-
nology.12 7 He also noted that more offensive
means of invading the privacy of those protected
by the Constitution are arising at an alarming
rate, and the Constitution should evolve to pro-
tect Americans from these invasions.'
28
An example of such a case is Silverman v. United
seizures is of no value, and... might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.
Id.
122 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463 (stating that the Fourth
Amendment's purpose was to do away with the destructive
English practice of general warrants and writs of assistance);
see also Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. at 625-26 (explaining general
warrants and writs of assistance). Writs of assistance empow-
ered the officers to search suspected places for smuggled
goods at their own discretion. General warrants were issued
for searching houses for the search and seizure of books and
papers that might be used to convict their owner of the
charge of libel. Id.
123 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
124 Id. at 466.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis,J., dissenting) (arguing "time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.").
127 See id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
128 See id. at 473-75 (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (citing En-
tick v. Carrington, 19 Howles State Trials, 1030, 1066).
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging
of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the of-
fense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property,
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States,129 in which the Supreme Court held that
law enforcement officers' warrantless use of a
microphone to eavesdrop on the defendant vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment because such a de-
vice constituted a physical intrusion into the de-
fendant's premises.' 30  The officers stationed
themselves in an adjacent row house and placed
the microphone in the heating system of the de-
fendant's home.1 3 1 Absent such a physical intru-
sion, the Supreme Court would have held that the
defendant's Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure would
not have been violated even without a warrant.
132
Six years later in Katz v. United States,1 33 the Su-
preme Court conducted a major revision of the
law regarding the government's use of electronic
surveillance. The petitioner posed his issues to the
Court in terms of constitutionally protected areas
and privacy rights in general.1 3 4 However, in tak-
ing an alternate view, the Court rephrased the is-
sue as whether the petitioner's Constitutional
rights under the Fourth Amendment were vio-
lated when an electronic listening device was at-
tached to a public telephone booth in which the
defendant was using the telephone.
1 35
The Court relied on the reasoning that peti-
tioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy,
and therefore the use of listening device was
deemed an unconstitutional search and
seizure.1 36 The Court held that although the
Fourth Amendment protects people and not
places, the petitioner sought to keep his conversa-
tion private despite the fact that he was in an area
where that right has never been forfeited by its convic-
tion of some public offense.
Id.
129 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
130 Id. at 508-10.
131 Id. at 506-07.
132 See id. (stating that the reason why the government
violated petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights was because
they overheard his conversation by means of trespassing into
the heating system in his home).
133 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
134 Id. at 349-50 (posing the issues in terms of whether a
public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so
that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening
device to the top of the booth is in violation of the constitu-
tional rights of privacy guaranteed to the occupant of the
booth and whether the protected area must be physically
penetrated before search and seizure can be deemed in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment).
135 Id. at 353.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 351.
138 Id. at 361 (holding that in order for a person to have
accessible to the public, and therefore, his conver-
sation was constitutionally protected.13 7 Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion provided an impor-
tant test for a reasonable expectation of privacy in
regard to Fourth Amendment protections.
138
This reasonable expectation of privacy rule has re-
mained in effect to this day. 139
Justice Black delivered a powerful argument
against the requirement of search warrants for
wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveil-
lance. He posited that the Fourth Amendment
was framed to deter the practice of actual break-
ing and entering to gain evidence against a per-
son to be used in a court of law140 and not to ap-
ply to intangible things such as spoken words.
141
The very characteristics of conversation provide
that this intangible concept cannot properly fit
under the the Fourth Amendment because it is
not a search or a seizure in the traditional
sense. 142
In the 1972 case of United States v. United States
District Court,143 the Supreme Court elaborated on
its Olmstead holding. 144 The government argued
that the Omnibus Crime Control Act imparts on
the government the right to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance to thwart threats to the na-
tion's security.
145
The Court recognized the necessity to balance
the citizens' needs for privacy and free expression
with the government's efforts to "protect itself
from acts of subversion and overthrow directed
against it."146 The Court concluded that the use of
wiretaps for domestic aspects of national security
Fourth Amendment protection, they must have an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy, and the expectation must
be one that society is prepared to deem as reasonable).
139 See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177,
1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (stating that a person challenging the
validity of a search and seizure may only assert a "reasonable
subjective expectation of privacy." The Court held that the
defendant did not have a reasonable and subjective expecta-
tion of privacy on the Internet because the openness of the
chat room diminished his expectation of privacy incre-
mentally).
140 Katz, 389 U.S. at 367.
141 Id. at 365-66.
142 Id.
143 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
144 Olsntead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that the wiretap-
ping did not amount to a search and seizure because there
was no actual trespass committed against petitioner).
145 United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 303.
146 Id. at 315.
The question that must be asked is whether the needs of
citizens for privacy and free expression may not be bet-
ter protected by requiring a warrant before such a sur-
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require prior judicial approval. 147
The previous discussion's goal was to aid the
reader in understanding the legal regime that the
NSA adheres to in its operation of electronic sur-
veillance for intelligence gathering purposes. The
following section is a discussion on the operation
of ECHELON within the aforementioned legal
framework.
VI. ECHELON'S OPERATION WITHIN ITS
STATED LEGAL REGIME
Despite the recent terrorist attacks on the
United States, Americans are not willing to sur-
render or loosen their hold on their fundamental
right to privacy.' 48 The majority of Americans, if
aware of the existence of ECHELON, would be-
lieve that the Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable search and seizure are di-
rectly violated by the operation of this surveillance
technology. However, this Comment asserts that
the oversight in the legal framework for operating
ECHELON adequately guarantees the steadfast
protections warranted by the Fourth Amendment,
while maintaining the national security of the
United States.
A. Allegations of Domestic Surveillance
1. Non-United States Persons
The NSA is not permitted to spy on American
citizens. The NSA's main priority is to gather sig-
nals intelligence from foreign powers and individ-
uals that pose a threat to the security of the
veillance is undertaken... and whether a warrant re-
quirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of Govern-
ment to protect itself from acts of subversion and over-
throw directed against it.
Id.
147 Id. at 321.
148 See Philip Shenon & Neil A. Lewis, Groups Fault to Lis-
ten, Search and Seize, NYTIMES.COM, at http://www.nytimes.
com (Sept. 21, 2001) (claiming that the broader wiretapping
authority granted by the Combating Terrorism Act 2001 is
vehemently opposed by numerous United States organiza-
tions); but see Ariana Eunjung Cha & Jonathan Krim, Privacy
Trade-Offs Reassessed, The Washington Post, Sep. 13, 2001, at
E01 (providing testimony that Americans are much more tol-
erant of government surveillance in the wake of the terrorist
attacks on the United States).
149 See Exec. Order No. 12,333 §1.12(b), 46 Fed. Reg.
59941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (establishing that the responsibilities of
the NSA are to collect, process and disseminate signals intelli-
gence for national foreign intelligence purposes).
150 See 50 U.S.C. §1802 (1994).
United States.' 49 The NSA adheres to the strict
guidelines established by FISA when it conducts
surveillance on foreign powers. FISA requires the
NSA to gain authorization from the Attorney Gen-
eral and abide by FISA's minimization procedures
if the electronic surveillance is directed at foreign
powers, and there is no substantial likelihood that
the surveillance will incidentally acquire informa-
tion pertaining to a United States citizens' com-
munications. 150 There is no need to obtain a war-
rant or court order to conduct this surveillance,
because foreign powers are not granted the con-
stitutional protections that are granted to the
American people.
1 5 1
2. United States Persons
FISA requires the NSA to obtain a court order
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
if a United States person is involved in electronic
surveillance. If the United States person is located
abroad, Executive Order 12,333 is the guiding au-
thority, and the NSA must obtain permission from
the Attorney General to conduct electronic sur-
veillance. 152 The only way a United States person
would be the object of the NSA's electronic sur-
veillance would be if that individual is deemed an
agent of a foreign power, in that he acts for, or on
behalf of the foreign power by: knowingly engag-
ing in intelligence gathering; knowingly engaging
in sabotage or international terrorism; knowingly
entering the United States under a false or fraud-
ulent identity; or knowingly aiding or abetting any
persons in the above-mentioned activities.
15 3
151 Id.
152 Legal Standards, supra note 18.
153 FISA defines agent of a foreign power to include:
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gath-
ering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power,
which activities involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any
other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf
of such foreign power, which activities involve or are
about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international ter-
rorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for
or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or
fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power
or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false
or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign
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If gathered information concerns a United
States person, the acquired information may be
used in a criminal proceeding if the Attorney
General provides advanced authorization, the ag-
grieved person is notified, and the FISA minimiza-
tion procedures are followed. 154 The acquisition
of such information must be necessary for, and
not merely related to, national defense, national
security or the conduct of foreign affairs of the
United States.
155
The operation of ECHELON adheres to the
aforementioned legal standards because it does
not conduct surveillance on its own citizens. The
NSA, in its operation of ECHELON, intercepts
communications that are sent abroad. If the com-
munications are to and from United States per-
sons and travel within the United States, the NSA
will not target those communications. 5 6 The
NSA's objective is to intercept foreign intelli-
gence, not domestic intelligence.' 57 However, it
may appear that the NSA spies on its own citizens
because the other UKUSA countries may inter-
cept United States persons' communications and
analyze them for threatening content. 58 It is al-
leged that there are situations in which another
UKUSA country intercepted American communi-
cations, analyzed them, and then determined that
they were a threat to the national security of the
United States and therefore notified the NSA of
the situation. 159 This is legal under the stated
guidelines.' 60 If the intercepted information was
mistakenly tagged as containing questionable in-
formation, the analyst would examine the data
and then discard it from the system if she deter-
mined that the contents do not warrant con-
cern. 16
1
ECHELON's operation also adheres to the min-
imization procedures established by FISA. 16 2 The
power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct
of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C)
or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in ac-
tivities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
50 U.S.C. §1801(b) (1994).
154 50 U.S.C. §1806 (1994).
155 Legal Standards, supra note 18.
156 Id.
157 NSA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 13
(stating that the NSA performs signals intelligence opera-
tions against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers, and
not on Americans).
158 See Zimmerman & Hurd, supra note 48.
159 See id.
160 See generally Legal Standards, supra note 18.
NSA intercepts a vast amount of telephone, fax
and e-mail communications, but only a small frac-
tion actually get analyzed by NSA employees. The
majority of intercepts flow through the system
without ever being seen or heard by a live person.
If the communication does not get flagged for
analysis, it simply gets kicked out of the system,
and no one's privacy is violated. Simply stated, if
people are not doing anything wrong or illegal,
they have nothing to fear.
B. War and National Defense Legislation
Terrorism has notjust recently become a threat
to the United States-it was a threat to the United
States long before September 11, 2001. However,
the recent attacks on the United States brought
the issue of terrorism to the forefront. The NSA
was established in 1952 and has performed the
functions of gathering intelligence and counter-
intelligence information since that time, attempt-
ing to prevent and detect acts of terror and war
against the United States, so our nation's citizens
may continue to realize their rights under the
Constitution.' 6 3 President Reagan sought to
strengthen this purpose with Executive Order
12,333, which was of great historical significance
in the evolution of war and national defense legis-
lation in the United States. 164 The statutory provi-
sion in which Executive Order 12,333 was incor-
porated states:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress
to provide a comprehensive program for the future se-
curity of the United States; to provide for the establish-
ment of integrated policies and procedures for the de-
partments, agencies, and functions of the Government
relating to the national security.
165
Congress' motivation in enacting this legisla-
tion was based on findings that "recent revolution-
161 See Richelson, supra note 7.
162 See NSA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 13
(stating that there is an internal review process within the
NSA, the Office of the Inspector General, that oversees com-
pliance with Executive Order 12,333).
163 See id.
164 See United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Rea-
gan, 557 F. Supp 61, 62 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding Executive
Order 12,333 constitutional. Stating that the Order "estab-
lishes the framework in which our governmental and military
agencies are to effectuate the process of gathering foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information, and the
manner in which intelligence-gathering functions will be
conducted at home and abroad).
165 Pub. L. No. 85-599, 61 Stat. 496 (1947) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §401).
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ary world events require a fundamental reassess-
ment of the defense and national security policies
of the United States,"' '66 and "real and potential
military threats to the United States and its allies
will continue to exist for the foreseeable future
from not just the Soviet Union but also from ter-
rorism and from Third World nations." 6 7 Con-
gress, back in 1947, realized that the United States
would have trouble maintaining its superpower
status. It also determined that our nation's ability
to guard against subversive countries establishes
the United States' position as "mother hen" over
those countries that cannot adequately protect
themselves from opposing governments.
168
The NSA must balance the aforementioned
considerations with the privacy rights granted to
all Americans. In doing so, the NSA has devel-
oped technological breakthroughs such as ECHE-
LON that aid in the goals of preventing hostile
governments and radical groups from destroying
the security of the United States. 169 At first glance,
ECHELON may appear to tread upon forbidden
soil, but further investigation reveals that ade-
quate safeguards have been established to protect
the civil liberties of all Americans.1 70 The NSA
and its intelligence community partners will con-
tinue to fight an uphill battle against those who
challenge their every move. With ever-evolving
technological advances coming out of the wood-
work, the government agencies and military fac-
tions in the intelligence community will have to
justify the existence of such increased technology
to their respective oversight boards and Congres-
sional oversight committees.' 7' In some situa-
tions, the oversight committees may find that the
encroachment on United States persons' civil lib-
erties is too broad, and the men and women that
our people have elected to represent our best in-
terests will be zealous advocates in a time of need.
166 Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1898 (1990) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §401).
167 Id.
168 Id. (stating that "emerging democracies around the
world will require political, technical, and economic assis-
tance, as well as military assistance, from the developed free
nations in order to thrive and to become productive mem-
bers of the world community").
169 See NSA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 13.
170 See Legal Standards, supra note 18.
171 See Bob Barr, Legislative Reform Commentaries: A Ty-
rant's Toolbox: Technology and Privacy in America, 26 J. LEGIS.
71, 72-76 (2000) (discussing the various technological ad-
vancements and the need for an effective mechanism for pro-
tecting privacy in the information age).
However, if Congress finds that questionable
technology is necessary to effectuate the purpose
of a government agency, the military or the Con-
stitution, it may determine that new legislation is
necessary despite public opinion to the contrary.
In response to the September l1th tragedy, for
example, Congress enacted the Uniting and
Strengthening America Act by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 ("U.S.A. Patriot Act") .172
This bill provided the government with reduced
judicial oversight for tapping phones, tracing e-




In light of the recent terrorist attacks on the
United States, the evaluation of privacy matters
must be conducted in a new context. The NSA is
not asking Americans to put their privacy rights by
the wayside, but it does hope to prove that its in-
terception capabilities are not as broadly sweep-
ing as one may imagine. The prospect that one's
private communications have a slim chance of in-
terception by a government agency should be
weighed against the benefit of the existence of
technological surveillance such as ECHELON.
174
For law-abiding citizens, the benefits of a secure
nation far outweigh the infrequent risks to one's
individual expectation of private communica-
tions. Despite certain intrusions into United
States citizens' privacy rights, there are adequate
judicial, statutory and administrative safeguards
that protect Americans from an abuse of govern-
mental power and secrecy. If the NSA is to con-
tinue to serve the nation by providing and pro-
tecting vital information, we must "embrace
change and resume our place on the forward
172 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (providing
law enforcement authorities with new powers to conduct a
more comprehensive form of wiretap surveillance). The
ramifications of the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001 on ECHE-
LON's operation are not discussed in this Comment.
173 Jess Bravin, Senate Sends Antiterrorism Bill to Bush, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001, at A3 (describing the implications of the
U.S.A. Patriot Act).
174 Lawrence D. Sloan, Note, ECHELON and the Legal Re-
straints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 DuKE
L.J. 1467, 1510 (2001) (stating that ECHELON must be "per-
mitted to function in the most effective manner possible that
does not unacceptably compromise the privacy and freedoms
that are so important to Americans").
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edge of technology."' 75
175 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, TRANSFORM THE
CRYPTOLOGIC SYSTEM, at http://www.nsa.gov/about-nsa/
strategic/transform.htm1.
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